Denver Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 17

January 1989

Constitutional Law
Denver University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Denver University Law Review, Constitutional Law, 66 Denv. U. L. Rev. 695 (1989).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239
Defendant Reedy appeals the district court's denial of his motion to
dismiss his indictment on grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) is unconstitutional because of overbreadth and vagueness. Affirmed.
In July, 1985, defendant took nineteen photographs of his stepdaughter, age nine, and her friend, age 11. The photographs were taken
while the girls were naked and posing in such a manner as to expose
their genitals. The defendant sent the film to a processing lab, whereupon lab employees contacted the police. Defendant now appeals on
grounds that the Child Protection Act is impermissibly overbroad, in violation of the first amendment, and vague, in violation of the fifth
amendment.
This court holds that the overbreadth doctrine, an exception to the
general rule that one cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute
as applied to third parties, is not operative in this case. The statute in
question does not reach beyond the unprotected activity of child pornography. The statutory language is not unconstitutionally vague, because it provides sufficient warning as to the proscribed conduct.
Vandehoef v. National TransportationSafety Board, 850 F.2d 629
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) suspended plaintiff's
commercial pilot certificate, (Lighter than Air Free Balloon rating), for
90 days due to violations of the FAA regulations relating to minimum
safe altitudes for flight and for careless or reckless operation of his balloon. Plaintiff appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). His appeal was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ),
who reduced the suspension to 30 days. The decision of the ALJ was
appealed to the NTSB, which reinstated the 90-day suspension. The
plaintiff appealed for a review of the NTSB action. He conceded that
the findings of the ALJ, which were adopted by the NTSB, were supported by substantial evidence. He urged as grounds for relief that section 91.79(b) of FAA regulations was unconstitutionally vague and that
the ALJ failed to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 821.42,
which state that the credibility of witnesses should be included in the
statement of findings. Since all witnesses testified to the same facts
which were not actually in dispute, it was not necessary that the ALJ
assess the credibility of each witness. The FAA regulation clearly provides parameters for operation and the words "except when necessary
for takeoff or landing" are not vague. Affirmed.
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers and Pacheco v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642
This appeal involves two lawsuits consolidated for trial, Pueblo and
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Pacheco. The panel reviewed the district court's denial of the appellants'
motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
The plaintiffs in both lawsuits are patients who dispute the seizure,
inspection, copying, and retention of medical records from two facilities
operated by Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. (PNHC) in
Pueblo, Colorado. Suspecting Medicaid fraud, Losavio (then state district attorney), other state officials and employees of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services entered the two PNHC facilities and conducted searches and seizures pursuant to warrants issued.
Medical records concerning the patient-plaintiffs and others were inspected and microfilmed.
Initially, the panel holds the district court's denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
constitutes an appealable decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Then,
the district court failed to apply the proper standard in resolving the
qualified immunity issue. An objective test is used to determine whether
qualified immunity applies.
In Pacheco, the appellees claim that the search and seizure of PNHC
medical records violated their right to privacy. However, the appellees
did not meet their burden under the objective test, because they fail to
cite precedent that demonstrated that appellants encroached on a
clearly established privacy zone. The panel reverses the district court in
Pacheco. Summary judgment should have been granted.
In Pueblo, appellees allege that the federal appellants acted under
color of state law to abridge appellees' first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth
amendment rights when they participated in the search and seizure of
PNHC records. The panel finds that the valid search warrant made it
reasonable for appellants to believe that the search and seizure was lawful. Qualified immunity shields these appellants from fourth and fifth
amendment claims.
Appellees needed more than conclusory, nonspecific allegations to
overcome the motion for summary judgment. The panel remands the
case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining if specific, nonconclusory evidence before the court when the summary judgment motion was made was sufficient to support the appellees'
unconstitutional motive claim.
Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789
Appellant was an electrical inspector for Kansas City. He refused to
approve a baseball field as operational because of dangerous electrical
violations. Overruled by a supervisor, he filed a report criticizing the
supervisor's order and was thereafter fired for insubordination. He filed
suit claiming he was fired in retaliation for his criticisms. The district
court granted summary judgment for the city.
The Tenth Circuit held appellant's criticism was protected speech
under the first amendment. His speech was not motivated by personal
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interest, but was primarily for the purpose of informing his superiors of
improper and illegal conduct and was of public concern. The evidence
indicated appellant's termination may have been partially motivated by
his constitutionally protected speech. Reversed.
United States v. Soto Hernandez, 849 F.2d 1325
Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and actual distribution of heroin. Defendant argues that he was
denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. He
bases this on an allegation that a conflict of interest exists, arising out of
his counsel's prior representation of, in an unrelated matter, the individual that defendant claims coerced him into committing the crime. He
seeks a new trial on this ground. Judgment affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that no conflict of interest existed. Furthermore, it held that the lack of communication between the defendant and
his counsel based on defendant's alleged distrust did not render the attorney's performance ineffective per se, especially since the alleged lack
of confidence did not prevent defendant from talking to the attorney
about the essentials of the defense.
American Petrofina Company of Texas v. Nance, 859 F.2d 840
Appellant members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission appeal the
district court's finding that the 1984 amendments to the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (Act), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, sections
651-687 (1971), violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, and that the Oklahoma amendments' scheme for the custodial
taking of unclaimed property is preempted by federal common law.
Affirmed.
The 1984 amendments require the plaintiffs to transfer proceeds
from unlocated owners' mineral interests to the state tax commission
where money is placed in the Abandoned Mineral Interest Revolving
Fund. The money is invested to generate interest income for the state.
After seven years, the money is deemed abandoned and is subject to the
strictures of the Act. The statute fails because of the Supreme Court
decision in Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965), which limited that
states' power to take custody of unclaimed property in order to ensure
thc free flow of commerce.
United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467
Appellants Clark, an accountant, and Thibodeau, an attorney, appeal a district court order enforcing an Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.)
summons for the production of various documents pertaining to the tax
liability of one of their clients. Clark and Thibodeau alleged the act of
producing the documents would have testimonial aspects violative of the
fifth amendment's prohibition against self incrimination, and that the
documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district
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court found that the act of producing documents was not self incriminating, and issued an order which enforced and broadened the I.R.S.'s
summons. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The court of appeals found that the requested documents would
not have been privileged in the hands of Thibodeau's client, and because of this, Thibodeau could not use the attorney-client privilege to
protect them. But the court of appeals did find that part of the district
court's order which broadened the I.R.S.'s summons to cover all of the
client's financial records to be impermissibly broad.
Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042
Appellant was an inmate of the Colorado Department of Corrections. He brought a civil rights action, alleging that various defendants
deprived him of equal protection and due process by failing to include
the time he served prior to sentencing in the computation of "good
time," as required by Colorado case law. Even though defendants stipulated that appellant was held for two months longer than he should have
been due to error in the complutation of "good time," the district court
dismissed his case for damages on eleventh amendment immunity
grounds. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but held that the defendants who
had been sued in their individual capacities were only qualifiedly immune from suit. The court found that appellant failed to clearly establish constitutional rights when the pre-sentence good time credit was
withheld.
Dichenson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435
Appellants, Dickenson and Weaver, had been appointed as head
jailer and administrative assistant to the former sheriff. The sheriff was
defeated for re-election by appellee, Quarberg, who shortly discharged
both appellants. They filed suit alleging violations of their constitutional rights under the first and fourteenth amendments, asserting that
they were discharged because of their association with the former sheriff
and that their terminations violated their due process rights. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding as to the
allegations of violations of the appellants' property and liberty interests.
However, the court held that it cannot be said that political party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance as a head
jailer or administrative assistant. Since the appellee offered no sufficient
justification for demanding political loyalty from the appellants, the
court found a genuine issue of material fact as to the actual motivation
of Quarberg in discharging the appellants. Therefore, the issue of motivation was remanded for determination by the district court.
Rowley v. Board of Education, 863 F.2d 39
Appellant Board of Education appeals the district court's order
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granting appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellee sued
for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982) seeking to enjoin appellants from
preventing him from participating in interscholastic volleyball competition solely because of his sex. Appellee alleges that the absolute prohibition on male participation violates his fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection and his rights under Title IX. Reversed.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court applied a test
for this gender-based classification which was more stringent than was
constitutionally required in its determination of appellee's likelihood of
success on the merits of his equal protection claim.
Brown v. HartshornePublic School Dist. No. 1, 864 F.2d 680
Appellant Brown filed a civil rights action against appellee school
district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) after the school district
had turned down her application for employment for ten straight years.
Appellant alleges that appellee discriminated against her, and refused to
hire her in the 1985-86 school year in retaliation for her previous suits.
The district court granted the school district's motion for a summary
judgment and dismissed Brown's entire complaint because she had not
filed an EEOC charge for the 1985-86 school year. The district court
failed to address Brown's § 1983 claim. Reversed.
The Tenth Circuit held that aside from appellant's claims for the
1985-86 school year, the district court ignored the appellant's discrimination claims made in 1984. The court also concluded that appellant's
1985-86 related claims would be properly before the district court if
either of Brown's claims were true: That the school district's decision
not to hire her for the 1985-86 school year was (1) in retaliation for her
EEOC filing and (2) part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination. The
court held Brown should have the opportunity to prove her allegations
and the propriety of jurisdiction. Finally, the court found that the district court ignored Brown's § 1983 claim by dismissing her Title VII action. Claims under § 1983 and Title VII differ significantly in their
statutes of limitations, exhaustion requirements, and available remedies.
The court of appeals noted the district court should apply these differing standards to the seperate causes of action in this case on remand.
Milo v. Cushing Municipal Hospital, 861 F.2d 1194
Appellant doctors alleged that the defendant-appellee hospital suspended them because of reported misconduct by a fellow physician,
thereby infringing upon their rights to free speech and due process.
The district court granted defendent hospital's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that suspension of a physician's medical staff
privileges do not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Reversed.
The court of appeals held that the hospital was a public institution,
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and that its suspension of appellants' medical staff privileges could constitute the requisite state action needed to support a § 1983 claim.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cargill, 855 F.2d 682
Appellee Cargill maintains a life insurance benefits plan that treats
employees age 60 and over differently than younger employees. The
plan was instituted years before the passage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) sued Cargill alleging the plan violated the Act.
The district court granted Cargill's motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Cargill's plan was exempt from the ADEA because it had been in existence prior to the act's
passage. For this reason, the court noted Cargill's plan could not be a
subterfuge to evade the ADEA.
Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512
Appellant Meade had been arrested and placed in a cityjail. Meade
requested medical attention and was told he would have to wait until he
arrived at the county facility. At the county facility, Meade alleged he
bent over to avoid passing out and was kicked by a deputy sheriff, appellee Grubbs. Appellant then filed, pro se, a § 1983 action against
Grubbs, his supervisor, the agency which trained him, and the county
commissioners. Grubbs and the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss, to which Meade responded to with a motion for an extension of
time in which to file. The district court denied the motion for an extension of time, and dismissed the action with prejudice. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
The court of appeals noted that to dismiss a cause of action with
prejudice was a severe sanction reserved for exteme circumstances. In
this case, there was no showing that the defendants were prejudiced by
Meade's failure to comply with the local rule, and as a result, such a
severe sanction was unwarranted in this instance.
The court also held that if Meade's allegations of excessive force
were true, sufficient grounds for a valid constitutional claim existed
against not only Deputy Grubbs, but also his supervisor and the agency
that trained him. But the court held that the County Commissioner
could not be properly joined in this cause of action, since they had no
statutory controls over the deputies.
Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250
Petitioner, prior to being convicted and sentenced, spent 284 days
in jail because he was indigent and unable to post bond. The district
court denied petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he
asserted that the judge improperly refused to credit his sentence for the
time he spent in custody prior to sentencing. Petitioner appealed to the
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Tenth Circuit, asserting that his equal protection rights had been violated in that his indigency resulted in a greater sentence than would
have been imposed on a wealthier person.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. In holding that petitioner's equal protection rights were not violated, the court found that petitioner did not
show that he is a member of a class denied a benefit that is available to
others similarly situated. Petitioner's arguments erroneously assumed
that only indigents are unable to post bond. Furthermore, the court
found that the judge had considered petitioner's pretial confinement in
setting the sentence, which placed petitioner in the same position as
those released on bail. The court also held that due process fairness was
met by the judge's consideration of petitioner's presentence confinement in setting the sentence, which is within the statutory limitation for
his offense.

